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Note 
BONA FIDE PROTECTION:  FULFILLING CERCLA’S LEGISLATIVE 
PURPOSE BY APPLYING DIFFERING DEFINITIONS OF “DISPOSAL” 
EMILEE MOONEY SCOTT 
 
In the late 1970s, the Love Canal disaster brought toxic contamination 
into the American consciousness as never before.  In response, Congress 
passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response and Liability Act of 
1980 (“CERCLA”), with the aim of cleaning up contaminated sites and 
making the polluters pay.  Unfortunately, the draconian liability scheme 
imposed by CERCLA has made investors wary of redeveloping possibly 
contaminated industrial property.  To combat this problem, Congress 
passed the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization 
Act.  The Brownfields Act amends CERCLA to provide liability protection 
for landowners who would otherwise be liable, but who did not own the 
land in question at the time of disposal of hazardous substances. 
Liability protection hinges on whether disposal occurred during the 
landowner’s ownership period, but the federal courts of appeal disagree 
on the precise meaning of disposal.  The prevailing view gives disposal an 
expansive meaning, consistent with CERCLA’s legislative purpose but 
inconsistent with the amendment meant to encourage redevelopment.  In 
the 2007 case Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., the U.S. 
Supreme Court reiterated the principle that the same word may be 
interpreted differently in different parts of the same statutory scheme.  This 
Note argues that the word “disposal” should be given two different 
meanings under CERCLA, to respect the two different sets of 
Congressional concerns which shaped its passage.   
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BONA FIDE PROTECTION:  FULFILLING CERCLA’S LEGISLATIVE 
PURPOSE BY APPLYING DIFFERING DEFINITIONS OF “DISPOSAL” 
EMILEE MOONEY SCOTT* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Undoubtedly, there is a natural presumption that identical words used 
in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.”1  
This presumption, however, is “not rigid and readily yields” when context 
so warrants.2  In 2007, the United States Supreme Court reiterated this 
point, holding that there is “no effectively irrebuttable presumption that the 
same defined term in different provisions of the same statute must be 
interpreted identically. Context counts.”3 The context of the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response and Liability Act of 1980 
(“CERCLA”),4 the statutory scheme that apportions liability for 
contaminated land, allows for different definitions of the term “disposal.”  
Indeed, CERCLA’s context demands different definitions in order to 
respect the legislative intent behind CERCLA and its amendments. 
CERCLA was enacted in 1980 with the intention of cleaning up the 
nation’s hazardous waste sites, while making polluters pay for the 
cleanup.5  Spurred to act by the Love Canal disaster,6 Congress recognized 
                                                                                                                          
* Smith College, A.B. 2005; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2010.  I 
would like to extend my sincere thanks to Professor Kurt Strasser for his invaluable comments on the 
many drafts of this Note.  I would also like to thank my father Thomas B. Mooney for his guidance 
throughout the writing process, and the members of the Connecticut Law Review for their hard work.  
This Note is dedicated to my parents, my sister, and my husband James for their constant love and 
support.  Any errors contained herein are mine alone. 
1 Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932). 
2 Id. 
3 Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 575–76 (2007) (citation and internal quotations 
omitted). 
4 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 
94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006)). 
5 See, e.g., Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi. v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, 
Inc., 473 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[CERCLA] was intended, for one, to ‘establish a 
comprehensive response and financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems associated 
with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites.’  Second, CERCLA was meant to shift the 
costs of cleanup to the parties responsible for the contamination.” (citation omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. 
NO. 96-1016, at 22 (1980))); Pritikin v. DOE, 254 F.3d 791, 794–95 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that 
“CERCLA was enacted to protect and preserve public health and the environment by facilitating the 
expeditious and efficient cleanup of hazardous waste sites” (citations and internal quotations omitted)); 
Richard C. Hula, Changing Priorities and Programs in Toxic Waste Policy: The Emergence of 
Economic Development as a Policy Goal, 15 ECON. DEV. Q. 181, 187 (2001) (asserting that CERCLA 
was enacted in order to quickly remediate contaminated land and protect public health);  see also infra 
notes 40–59 and accompanying text. 
6 Love Canal was an old canal that was filled with a chemical waste landfill and then covered 
with soil and grass, but the name came to refer to the whole neighborhood.  See ADELINE GORDON 
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that “hazardous waste ha[d] been disposed of throughout the United States 
in a manner which has resulted in, and which may in the future result in, 
dangerous releases.”7  As a result, CERCLA imposes broad (some would 
say “draconian”8) liability for environmental remediation on a wide range 
of parties associated with hazardous waste sites, including present owners, 
owners at the time of disposal, and those involved in transporting 
hazardous waste.9 
Meanwhile, through the latter half of the twentieth century, urban areas 
lost much of their population and manufacturing base, leaving behind 
abandoned factories, warehouses, and the like.10  An estimated 450,00011 
of these sites, known as brownfields,12 can be found all over the country.13  
Unfortunately, since these sites have the potential to be contaminated with 
toxic waste, CERCLA’s broad imposition of liability drives away investors 
and discourages redevelopment.14 
                                                                                                                          
LEVINE, LOVE CANAL: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND PEOPLE 11 (1982); see also infra notes 44–50 and 
accompanying text. 
7 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, at 2 (1980); see also id. at 18 (citing a 1979 study by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) that “estimated that as many as 30,000 to 50,000 [hazardous waste] sites 
existed, of which between 1,200–2,000 present a serious risk to public health”). 
8 See, e.g., William Funk, Federal and State Superfunds: Cooperative Federalism or Federal 
Preemption, 16 ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (1985) (“Congress included in CERCLA a draconian, retroactive 
liability provision applicable to generators, transporters, or land owners with some nexus to the 
abandoned hazardous wastes needing cleanup.”); Theodore Waugh, Where Do We Go from Here: 
Legal Controls and Future Strategies for Addressing the Transportation of Hazardous Wastes Across 
International Borders, 11 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 477, 496 (2000) (“CERCLA’s liability scheme is so 
draconian that a generator may seek to export hazardous wastes, in part, as a means of reducing 
litigation concerns.”); Peter Niemiec, The Brownfield Blues: Recent Legislation Intended To Promote 
the Cleanup and Reuse of Brownfields May Actually Have the Opposite Effect, L.A. LAW., Jan. 2003, at 
32 (“[CERCLA’s] draconian liability scheme has brought much financial pain to those who have 
bought industrial and commercial properties either before CERCLA’s passage or, afterwards, without 
due consideration for the problems they were purchasing.”). 
9 See infra notes 65–73 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 97–102 and accompanying text. 
11 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ROAD MAP TO UNDERSTANDING INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY OPTIONS 
FOR BROWNFIELDS INVESTIGATION AND CLEANUP 36 (4th ed. 2005), available at 
http://www.brownfieldstsc.org/pdfs/Roadmap.pdf; EPA, About Brownfields, http://www.epa.gov/ 
swerosps/bf/about.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2010). 
12 A “brownfield” is “real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be 
complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.”  
42 U.S.C. § 9601(39)(A) (2006). 
13 See generally U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, RECYCLING AMERICA’S LAND: A NATIONAL REPORT 
ON BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT (2006), available at www.usmayors.org/74thAnnualMeeting/ 
brownfieldsreport_060506.pdf (presenting the results of a survey of mayors nationwide on brownfields 
in their communities). 
14 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 107-2, at 2 (2001) (“The fear of prolonged entanglements in Superfund’s 
liability scheme has been reported by some to be an impediment to the cleanup of even lightly 
contaminated sites, today known as brownfields.”); Todd S. Davis, Defining the Brownfields Problem, 
in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 3, 13 
(Todd S. Davis ed., 2d ed. 2002) (“The environmental and liability issues surrounding brownfields 
have had the same chilling effect on real estate developers and lenders that the movie Jaws has had on 
swimmers.  We know the sharks are out there.  And as is the case with certain sharks, some 
environmental liabilities will eat you alive.”); Kris Wernstedt et al., The Brownfields Phenomenon: 
Much Ado About Something or the Timing of the Shrewd? 2 (Resources for the Future, Discussion 
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In an attempt to encourage the redevelopment of brownfields,15 
Congress enacted the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields 
Revitalization Act of 2002 (“Brownfields Act”).16  The Brownfields Act 
amended CERCLA to give brownfield redevelopers protection from 
liability as long as “[a]ll disposal of hazardous substances at the facility 
occurred before [they] acquired the facility”17 and other conditions are 
satisfied.18  While many commentators have expressed hope that the 
Brownfields Act will fulfill its goal of encouraging brownfield 
redevelopment,19 others have noted that the Act leaves many unanswered 
questions and potential liability traps that may impair its usefulness.20  The 
complexity and ambiguity of CERCLA’s liability scheme, even after the 
passage of the Brownfields Act, continues to hinder brownfield 
redevelopment.21 
This Note addresses one such ambiguity: the proper definition of the 
word “disposal.”22  The definition of “disposal” is critical because 
protection as a bona fide prospective purchaser or innocent landowner 
depends upon whether disposal has occurred in the party’s ownership 
period.  The federal circuit courts disagree as to what, precisely, “disposal” 
means, with the disagreement centering on the issue of how much human 
                                                                                                                          
Paper 04–46), available at www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-04-46.pdf (“As a result of 
[CERCLA], owners and prospective buyers of properties thought to be contaminated are leery of 
attracting regulatory attention and becoming responsible for cleanup.”); Flannary P. Collins, Note, The 
Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act: A Critique, 13 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F. 303, 309 (2003) (asserting that CERCLA “caused potential developers to shy away from 
redeveloping brownfield sites due to ambiguous liability and uncertain litigation and cleanup costs”);  
Julia A. Solo, Comment, Urban Decay and the Role of Superfund: Legal Barriers to Redevelopment 
and Prospects for Change, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 285, 286 (1995) (arguing that “it has become clear that 
Superfund has also had a number of unintended effects, the most serious being to dissuade industry 
from redeveloping on former industrial land” (citations omitted)). 
15 See infra notes 113–66 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the 
Brownfields Act). 
16 Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-118, 115 
Stat. 2356 (2002) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006)). 
17 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(A). 
18 See infra notes 135–66 and accompanying text. 
19 See Collins, supra note 14, at 328; Amy Pilat McMorrow, Note, CERCLA Liability Redefined: 
An Analysis of the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act and Its Impact on 
State Voluntary Cleanup Programs, 20 GA. ST. U.  L. REV. 1087, 1089 (2004). 
20 See Niemiec, supra note 8, at 36. 
21 See C. GREGORY ROGERS, FINANCIAL REPORTING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES AND RISKS 
AFTER SARBANES-OXLEY 38 (2005) (“With [CERCLA’s] potentially costly and ambiguous liability, 
businesses often choose the safety of suburban locations over inner-city brownfields.”). 
22 This ambiguity has been identified by others.  See, e.g., Dale A. Guariglia et al., The Small 
Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act: Real Relief or Prolonged Pain?, 32 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,505, 10,507 (2002) (“The meaning of ‘disposal’ may vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, and a broad construction could result in a violation of the condition if, for example, the 
purchased property contains leaching contaminants, or contaminants leaking from buried drums or 
tanks.”). 
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agency is required.23  This disagreement becomes especially important in 
situations involving, for example, a leaking drum hidden somewhere on the 
property.  According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit, a leak in a buried tank or drum constitutes “disposal” under 
CERCLA even if the landowner is unaware of the drum’s very existence.24  
The Sixth Circuit, by contrast, has held that disposal requires “evidence 
that there was human activity involved in whatever movement of 
hazardous substances occurred on the property.”25  The Second,26 Third,27 
and Ninth28 Circuits have not directly commented on the issue, but have 
suggested that they would agree with the Fourth Circuit.  Hundreds of 
thousands of brownfields have not yet been identified and remediated29 and 
a substantial number of these sites likely contain leaky underground 
storage tanks or drums.30 
To a prospective brownfield developer, a leaky drum could thus 
become a landmine of liability.  While there are a number of state and 
federal programs that encourage brownfield redevelopment through grants 
and technical assistance,31 relief from CERCLA liability could provide 
                                                                                                                          
23 For previous commentators’ discussion of the circuit split over the precise meaning of the word 
“disposal” under CERCLA, see generally Khara Coleman, Note, Disposing of Leaks and Spills: 
Passive Disposal of Hazardous Wastes Under CERCLA, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 945 (2002); see also 
generally Ranen Schechner, Note, Putting the Remedial Cart Before the Statutory Horse: The Ninth 
Circuit Reopens Debate on CERCLA’s Definition of Disposal, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 69 (2001) 
(discussing how the Ninth Circuit has reopened the debate); Jasmine M. Starr, Note, Making Good 
Neighbors: Liability for Passive Migration of Hazardous Waste Under CERCLA, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
435 (2004) (arguing that a narrow definition of disposal is inappropriate). 
24 See Crofton Ventures Ltd. P’ship v. G & H P’ship, 258 F.3d 292, 297 (4th Cir. 2001); see also 
infra notes 193–207 and accompanying text. 
25 See United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 706 (6th Cir. 2000); see also infra notes 
208–13 and accompanying text. 
26 See Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Jones Chem., Inc., 315 F.3d 171, 178 (2d Cir. 2003); see 
also infra notes 219–20 and accompanying text. 
27 See United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 711 (3d Cir. 1996); see also infra notes 
214–18 and accompanying text. 
28 See Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 879 (9th Cir. 2001); see also infra 
notes 221–24 and accompanying text. 
29 In 2004, the EPA estimated that approximately 217,000 hazardous waste sites would be 
discovered in the coming decades.  ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEANING UP THE NATION’S WASTE 
SITES: MARKETS AND TECHNOLOGY TRENDS 1-4 (2004), available at http://www.clu-in.org/download/ 
market/2004market.pdf.  This estimate was based on the rate of new site discoveries in the 1990s and 
beginning of this decade and “assumes that EPA will add new sites to the [National Priorities List] for 
another [ten] years, [underground storage tank] site discoveries will continue for [ten] years, and new 
state and private party site discoveries will continue for [thirty] years.”  Id. at viii, 1-4. 
30 While the number of undiscovered leaky drums or tanks is necessarily uncertain, the EPA 
estimates that 100,000 to 200,000 of the approximately 450,000 brownfield sites nationwide may 
contain abandoned underground storage tanks.  ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ROAD MAP, supra note 11, at 
36.  The EPA estimates that 90,000 new sites with leaking underground storage tanks will arise or be 
discovered between 2004 and 2013.  ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEANING UP, supra note 29, at 1-5. 
31 See generally TODD S. DAVIS, BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING 
CONTAMINATED PROPERTY (2d ed. 2002) (detailing brownfields programs in numerous states); John 
Stainback, The Public/Private Finance of Redevelopment, in REDEVELOPMENT: PLANNING, LAW, AND 
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 155 (Brian W. Blaesser & Thomas P. Cody eds., 2008) (discussing 
opportunities for public/private partnerships in redevelopment projects); Julianne Kurdila & Elise 
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even more encouragement.32  In a 2004 study, Resources for the Future 
showed that brownfield redevelopers found “the value of liability relief for 
future cleanups [to be] strongly positive” even if it came with additional 
community and agency involvement.33  Nine years after the passage of the 
Brownfields Act, it is still unclear what type of disposal would render a 
party ineligible for protection as a bona fide prospective purchaser, making 
the defense less useful in encouraging cleanups. 
The concept of “disposal” has two distinct functions in CERCLA, so 
there is room for the Fourth Circuit’s expansive interpretation of “disposal” 
to coexist with the Sixth Circuit’s more limited interpretation.  The first 
function of the word “disposal” is in determining which past owners of a 
site can be held liable for current contamination, as owners at the time of 
disposal.  The more expansive interpretation of disposal favored by the 
Fourth Circuit34 should be used for this function, because it is consistent 
with CERCLA’s original legislative purpose.  In 1980, “Congress cast the 
liability net wide to capture all potentially responsible parties.”35  Courts 
have been mindful of this congressional goal, holding that due to 
CERCLA’s comprehensive remedial intent, courts are bound to “construe 
its provisions liberally to avoid frustrating the legislature’s purpose.”36 
The second function of the word “disposal” is to protect those who 
                                                                                                                          
Rindfleisch, Funding Opportunities for Brownfield Redevelopment, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 479 
(2007) (describing governmental and non-governmental sources of funding); James A. Kushner, 
Brownfield Redevelopment Strategies in the United States, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 857 (2006) 
(describing programs that encourage brownfield redevelopment and urban revitalization); Scott 
Sherman, Government Tax and Financial Incentives in Brownfields Redevelopment: Inside the 
Developer’s Pro Forma, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 317 (2003) (describing tax-based brownfields 
incentives); ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BROWNFIELDS FEDERAL PROGRAM GUIDE (2005), available at 
www.epa.gov/brownfields/partners/2005_fpg.pdf (describing federal brownfields programs); EPA, 
Brownfields and Land Revitalization: Grants & Funding, http://epa.gov/brownfields/grant_info/index. 
htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2010) (providing information on funding sources). 
32 See Wernstedt et al., supra note 14, at 13 (“[T]he relative effectiveness of nonfinancial 
interventions—a change in regulatory requirements such as reducing cleanup standards or liability 
relief that releases ‘innocent’ parties at contaminated sites from long-term damage claims—may be 
even more critical.”). 
33 Id. at 17. 
34 Crofton Ventures Ltd. P’ship v. G & H P’ship, 258 F.3d 292, 297 (4th Cir. 2001); see also infra 
notes 193–207 and accompanying text. 
35 Horsehead Indus. Inc. v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 258 F.3d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2001). 
36 Westfarm Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 66 F.3d 669, 677 
(4th Cir. 1995); see also, e.g., Sierra Club v. Seaboard Farms, Inc., 387 F.3d 1167, 1172 (10th Cir. 
2004) (“We agree with Sierra Club’s assertion that CERCLA . . . must be interpreted liberally so as to 
accomplish its remedial goals.”); Atl. Richfield Co. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564, 570 (10th Cir. 
1996) (“We note that because CERCLA is remedial legislation, it should be construed liberally to carry 
out its purpose.”); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(“[C]ourts have concluded that a liberal judicial interpretation is consistent with CERCLA’s 
overwhelmingly remedial statutory scheme.” (citations omitted)); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. 
& Chem. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986) (“We believe requiring proof of personal 
ownership or actual physical possession of hazardous substances as a precondition for liability under 
CERCLA § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3), would be inconsistent with the broad remedial purposes 
of CERCLA.”). 
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intend to redevelop brownfields, shielding current owners from liability as 
long as “disposal” stopped before the property was acquired.  While the 
expansive definition of disposal is consistent with CERCLA as a whole, it 
is completely inconsistent with the legislative goal of the Brownfields Act.  
The goal of the Brownfields Act was to encourage brownfield 
redevelopment by providing a safe harbor from liability.37  Senator Barbara 
Boxer articulated the Brownfield Act’s purpose to protect “people who are 
interested in cleaning up [a] brownfield site” but “afraid to get involved 
because they may become liable for somebody else’s mess.”38  It does not 
make any sense to condition liability protection on a definition of disposal 
designed to spread liability as far as possible.  Thus, the limited 
interpretation of disposal favored by the Sixth Circuit39 is more appropriate 
in the context of the bona fide prospective purchaser and innocent 
landowner defenses.  This Note discusses the meaning of disposal under 
CERCLA with reference to the political circumstances and legislative 
intentions behind CERCLA and the Brownfields Act.  Part II of this Note 
describes the emergence of hazardous waste as a public policy issue, and 
outlines CERCLA’s liability scheme.  Part III describes the brownfields 
issue and the CERCLA amendment that intended to encourage brownfield 
redevelopment.  Part IV examines the case law on the definition of 
“disposal” and contrasts the Fourth Circuit’s expansive interpretation with 
the Sixth Circuit’s more limited interpretation.  Finally, Part V reconciles 
the two definitions of disposal and concludes that while the passive 
definition favored by a majority of the circuits is more consistent with 
CERCLA’s general remedial purpose, the active definition favored by the 
Sixth Circuit is more appropriate for protected landowners. 
II.  CONTAMINATED LAND AND THE LIABILITY SCHEME UNDER CERCLA 
A.  Contaminated Land in the United States 
During the twentieth century, the United States grew and industrialized 
rapidly.  As society industrialized, waste products became “ever more toxic 
and persistent” and required more secure means of disposal.40  While 
technological solutions were developed, they lagged somewhat behind the 
demands of industry and society.41  By mid-century, engineers recognized 
that “growth, urbanization, and industrial expansion in the United States 
                                                                                                                          
37 For a discussion of the historical and political circumstances that led to the Brownfields Act’s 
passage, see infra notes 97–122 and accompanying text. 
38 147 Cong. Rec. 6241 (2001) (statement of Sen. Boxer). 
39 United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 705–06 (6th Cir. 2000).  For a more detailed 
discussion of the case, see infra notes 208–13 and accompanying text. 
40 CRAIG E. COLTEN & PETER N. SKINNER, THE ROAD TO LOVE CANAL: MANAGING INDUSTRIAL 
WASTE BEFORE EPA 3 (1996). 
41 Id. 
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[had] created major waste disposal problems.”42  Concern for water 
supplies led to water pollution controls, which in turn encouraged land-
based disposal of toxic substances.43  Land-based disposal, of course, 
creates its own set of problems. 
Love Canal gained infamy as a result of its use as a toxic substances 
landfill.  As was common at the time, the Hooker Electrochemical 
Company disposed of its chemical waste by burying drums in a landfill 
that it had constructed in an old canal.44  In the mid-1950s, Hooker covered 
the site with dirt and grass and sold it to the local school board.45  A school 
was completed in 1955, and a modest residential neighborhood grew 
around the school.46  Every so often the residents would smell noxious 
odors or suffer skin irritation after coming in contact with the soil, but they 
complained very little for about twenty years.47  Then the Niagara Falls 
area experienced a period of heavier than usual rainfall, and the toxic brew 
of Love Canal began seeping into nearby basements.48  In the summer of 
1978, the New York State Commissioner of Health declared that, in his 
opinion, the waste at Love Canal presented a “great and imminent peril to 
the health of the general public residing at or near the site.”49  By the 
summer of 1981, hundreds of families had left the area, their unsellable 
homes having been purchased by the State.50 
The Love Canal disaster brought toxic waste disposal into the public 
consciousness as never before.51  After six years of fruitless attempts to 
enact legislation addressing liability for the release of hazardous 
substances,52 public attention on Love Canal provided the catalyst for 
congressional action.53  CERCLA54 was signed into law by President 
                                                                                                                          
42 Gerald Meyer, Geological and Hydrologic Aspects of Stabilization Ponds, 32 J. WATER 
POLLUTION CONTROL FED’N 820, 820 (1960). 
43 COLTEN & SKINNER, supra note 40, at 68. 
44 LEVINE, supra note 6, at 10–11. 
45 Id. at 11–12. 
46 Id. at 12–13. 
47 Id. at 14–15. 
48 Id. at 15. 
49 Id. at 7. 
50 Id. at 213. 
51 See, e.g., COLTEN & SKINNER, supra note 40, at 1 (noting that while the Love Canal disaster 
means different things to different groups of people, it “has been seared into the collective memory of 
the country”). 
52 CAROLE STERN SWITZER & PETER GRAY, CERCLA: COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT (SUPERFUND) 5 (2d ed. 2008). 
53 Id. at 3; see also COLTEN & SKINNER, supra note 40, at 160 (calling Love Canal “the virtual 
birthplace of the Superfund legislation”).  The fact that the 1980 election had resulted in the Democrats 
losing control of the White House and the Senate also moved them to act while they were still in 
power.  SWITZER & GRAY, supra note 52, at 8. 
54 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 
(2006)). For a detailed contemporary account of the circumstances surrounding CERCLA’s passage, 
see generally Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Responses, 
Compensation and Liability (“Superfund”) Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982). 
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Carter on December 11, 1980, as the relocation of Love Canal residents 
was still in progress.55  CERCLA complemented the Resources 
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (“RCRA”),56 providing the 
“second part” of the federal law addressing hazardous substances.57  On the 
day CERCLA was signed into law, Representative Florio remarked that 
RCRA would prevent any new Love Canals, and CERCLA would provide 
for the remediation of toxic contamination that had already occurred.58  
Calling it “landmark in its scope and in its impact on preserving the 
environmental quality of our country,” President Carter said that CERCLA 
would begin a “massive and a needed cleanup of hazardous wastes[,] . . . a 
problem that had been neglected for decades or even generations.”59 
B.  CERCLA Liability 
CERCLA, as originally written, is fundamentally a public health 
statute, with the goal of preventing human exposure to toxic substances 
through remediation of contaminated sites.60  The “polluter pays” 
principle61 forms the philosophical core of CERCLA’s approach.62  Under 
the polluter pays principle, the goal is to “place the ultimate responsibility 
for the clean-up of hazardous waste on those responsible for problems 
                                                                                                                          
55 See Ralph Blumenthal, Many from Love Canal Still Unsettled, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1981, at 
26. 
56 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2006); see also City of Chi. v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 
(1994) (“RCRA is a comprehensive environmental statute that empowers EPA to regulate hazardous 
wastes from cradle to grave, in accordance with the rigorous safeguards and waste management 
procedures . . . .”). 
57 President Jimmy Carter, Remarks on Signing H.R. 7020 into Law (Dec. 11, 1980), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=44392 (statement by Rep. James Florio). 
58 Id.  Two commentators described the difference between CERCLA and RCRA as follows:  “If 
RCRA can be thought of as managing a hazardous substance from its cradle to its grave, Superfund is 
the fail-safe device should the substance rise from the dead.”  James F. Vernon & Patrick W. Dennis, 
Hazardous-Substance Generator, Transporter and Disposer Liability Under the Federal and 
California Superfunds, 2 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 67, 73 (1981). 
59 Carter, supra note 57. 
60 Hula, supra note 5, at 187; see also United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55 (1998) (stating 
that Congress enacted CERCLA in order to remedy “serious environmental and health risks posed by 
industrial pollution”); Westfarm Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 66 F.3d 
669, 677 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Congress enacted CERCLA to protect public health and the environment 
from inactive hazardous waste sites.”). 
61 See generally Michael J. Gergen, The Failed Promise of the “Polluter Pays” Principle: An 
Economic Analysis of Landowner Liability for Hazardous Waste, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624 (1994); Eric 
Thomas Larson, Why Environmental Liability Regimes in the United States, the European Community, 
and Japan Have Grown Synonymous with the Polluter Pays Principle, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 541 
(2005). 
62 “Most important[ly], [CERCLA] enables the Government to recover from responsible parties 
the costs of their actions in the disposal of toxic wastes.”  Carter, supra note 57.  Some commentators 
have criticized CERCLA for failing to apply the polluter pays principle in an appropriate and effective 
way.  See, e.g., Hongkyun Kim, Is the Korean Soil Environment Conservation Act’s Liability Too 
Severe?: Learning from CERCLA, 11 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 1, 29–30 (asserting that CERCLA 
“distorts the polluter pays principle” in that it “can be interpreted to impose liability on parties with 
virtually no nexus to the contamination”). 
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caused by the disposal of chemical poison.”63  As such, CERCLA imposes 
broad liability on a wide range of parties associated with contaminated 
sites.  This liability arises without regard to relative culpability, and the 
available defenses at the time of CERCLA’s passage were extremely 
limited.64 
Section 107(a) of CERCLA65 imposes strict liability66 upon classes 
known as potentially responsible parties for costs associated with the 
release or threatened release67 of hazardous substances.68  To establish a 
prima facie case for cost recovery under CERCLA section 107(a), a 
plaintiff must prove four elements: “(1) the site is a ‘facility’;[69] (2) a 
release or threatened release of hazardous substance has occurred; (3) the 
release has caused the plaintiff to incur ‘necessary costs of response’ 
consistent with the [National Contingency Plan (“NCP”)];[70] and (4) the 
defendant falls within one of the four categories of potentially responsible 
parties.”71  The four groups of potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”) 
include: (1) the current owner or operator of the facility; (2) the owner or 
operator of the facility at the time that any hazardous substances were 
disposed of; (3) any person who arranged for disposal, treatment, or 
transportation of hazardous substances; and (4) any person who transported 
hazardous substances to the facility.72  As CERCLA is a comprehensive 
                                                                                                                          
63 Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(citation omitted). 
64 See infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
65 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006). 
66 While the statute does not explicitly say that CERCLA imposes strict liability, it has been 
consistently interpreted as such by the courts.  See Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi. v. 
N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc., 473 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he EPA may recover its 
costs in full from any responsible party, regardless of that party’s relative fault.”); City of Wichita v. 
Aero Holdings, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1164 (D. Kan. 2000) (“Fault or culpability is irrelevant 
under CERCLA’s statutory scheme.”). 
67 “Release” is defined by 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (2006) to include “any spilling, leaking, 
pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or 
disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and 
other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant),” but 
excluding occupational exposure, motor vehicle emissions, and nuclear accidents.  This Note does not 
examine what constitutes a “release” under CERCLA, as the term is so broad as to encompass virtually 
any movement of contaminants within a site.  As the definition of “release” includes the word 
“disposing,” courts have taken the term “release” to describe a wider range of situations than 
“disposal.” 
68 “Hazardous substance” is defined by 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (2006) to include substances 
designated as hazardous by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A) (1994), 
the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (2006), the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2006), 
the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (2006), and any other toxic substances the EPA 
may deem hazardous under 42 U.S.C. § 9602 (2006).  For purposes of this Note, “hazardous substance” 
is any substance deemed to be hazardous under CERCLA. 
69 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (2006). 
70 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (2006). 
71 Franklin County Convention Facilities Auth. v. Am. Premier Underwriters, Inc., 240 F.3d 534, 
541 (6th Cir. 2001). 
72 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006). 
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remedial statutory scheme, courts typically construe its provisions liberally 
to avoid frustrating the legislature’s purpose.73 
Courts consistently impose joint and several liability under 
CERCLA,74 but Congress did not specify joint and several liability in the 
statute.75  Rather, Congress intended for the “scope of liability [to be] 
determined under common law principles, where a court performing a 
case-by-case evaluation of the complex factual scenarios associated with 
multiple-generator waste sites will assess the propriety of applying joint 
and several liability on an individual basis.”76  In United States v. Alcan 
Aluminum Corp., the Third Circuit examined the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts to determine which rules of liability should be applied:77  “[W]here 
joint tortfeasors cause a single and indivisible harm for which there is no 
reasonable basis for division according to the contribution of each, each 
tortfeasor is subject to liability for the entire harm.”78 
When multiple entities have owned or operated a site for a number of 
years, it is often difficult to determine who is responsible for the harm and 
precisely how much harm each entity caused, so joint and several liability 
is applied.79  When it is possible to discern which harms were caused by 
which defendant, it is appropriate to apportion the cleanup costs between 
defendants.80  In such cases, the defendant bears the burden of showing 
that the costs are capable of apportionment.81  CERCLA’s joint and several 
liability provision allows a plaintiff82 to hold one party with deep pockets 
                                                                                                                          
73 See Atl. Richfield Co. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564, 570 (10th Cir. 1996); Westfarm 
Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 66 F.3d 669, 677 (4th Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Aceto Agric. 
Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 
F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 
1081 (1st Cir. 1986); see also infra notes 226–37 and accompanying text. 
74 See, e.g., United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 137 n.7 (2007) (“We assume 
without deciding that §107(a) provides for joint and several liability.”). 
75 See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 268 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[B]oth the 
House and Senate deleted provisions imposing joint and several liability from their respective versions 
of the statute before its enactment.”). 
76 United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
77 Alcan Aluminium Corp., 964 F.2d at 268. 
78 Id. at 268–69. 
79 See Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi. v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc., 
473 F.3d 824, 827 n.3 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that it is possible to establish divisibility, but that it is “a 
rare scenario”). 
80 See Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d at 268 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A 
(1977)). 
81 See id. at 269 n.28 (“‘Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring 
about harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to limit his liability on the ground that 
the harm is capable of apportionment among them, the burden of proof as to the apportionment is upon 
each such actor.’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(2) (1977))). 
82 The plaintiff is often the EPA.  See, e.g., Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apts., 94 F.3d 
1489, 1513 (11th Cir. 1996).  Private parties may also be CERCLA plaintiffs.  See Joanna M. Fuller, 
Note, The Sanctity of Settlement: Stopping CERCLA’s Volunteer Remediators from Sidestepping the 
Settlement Bar, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 219, 233–38 (2009) (detailing the two causes of action—cost 
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responsible for the entire cost of cleanup,83 even if there are other viable 
parties who were responsible.84  In that case, the defendant can bring cost 
recovery actions against other PRPs to recover some of its costs.85 
Before 1986, the available defenses under CERCLA were quite 
limited.  Section 107(b) provided that a potentially responsible party would 
not be held liable if it could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the release or threatened release was caused solely by an act of God, an act 
of war, or “an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or 
agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in 
connection with a contractual relationship . . . with the defendant.”86  In the 
early 1980s, landowners who had purchased land from the original polluter 
were ineligible for the third party defense, because a “contractual 
relationship” had been created by the instrument conveying the property.87 
The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 
(“SARA”)88 relaxed liability slightly for the first time, offering protection 
to so-called “innocent landowners.”89  Concerned with the fairness of the 
system, Congress intended for the amendment to make clear that “under 
limited circumstances landowners who acquire property without knowing 
of any contamination at the site and without reason to know of any 
contamination . . . may have a defense to liability.”90  Representative 
Barney Frank, the sponsor of the amendment, said that “nothing can be 
more damaging to our efforts” to make CERCLA work properly than a 
scheme “that could inadvertently sweep out within its coils innocent 
individuals.”91 
SARA made the innocent landowner defense available to those who 
had purchased already-contaminated land by clarifying the meaning of 
“contractual relationship” in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A).  The statute now 
                                                                                                                          
recovery and contribution—available under CERCLA for volunteer remediators who wish to recover 
their costs). 
83 See Gergen, supra note 61, at 673–76 (1994) (discussing the inefficiencies caused by the 
common practice of going after “deep pockets” for remediation costs). 
84 See N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc., 473 F.3d at 827 (“[B]y invoking § 107(a), the EPA 
may recover its costs in full from any responsible party, regardless of that party’s relative fault.”). 
85 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2006).  Such actions allow PRPs “who are liable for some of the 
cleanup costs, but have paid more than their fair share of those costs, to recover the amount of their 
excess payments from other parties who are also responsible for the pollution.”  Blasland, Bouck & 
Lee, Inc. v. City of N. Miami, 283 F.3d 1286, 1302 (11th Cir. 2002). 
86 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982).  Only the third party defense will be analyzed in this Note, as the 
act of God and act of war defenses have very seldom been used. 
87 MICHAEL B. GERRARD & JOEL M. GROSS, AMENDING CERCLA: THE POST-SARA 
AMENDMENTS TO THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY 
ACT 44 (2006). 
88  Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 
(1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006)). 
89 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (providing a defense to landowners who can show they had no 
reason to know a property was contaminated prior to holding title). 
90 H.R. REP. NO. 99-962, at 186 (1986) (Conf. Rep.). 
91 131 CONG. REC. 34715 (1985) (statement of Rep. Frank). 
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provides that a “contractual relationship” does not include instruments 
transferring title or possession if the defendant acquired the facility after 
the disposal of the hazardous materials and purchased the land without 
knowing or having any reason to know of the contamination.92  In order to 
gain protection as an innocent landowner, the landowner must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he did not cause the pollution himself93 
and he must show that he was not aware of the pollution at the time of 
purchase.94  Additionally, he must show that he took due care with respect 
to the pollution and that he took “precautions against foreseeable acts or 
omissions of . . . third part[ies].”95  In order to establish that he had no 
reason to know of the contamination, the landowner must have conducted 
“all appropriate inquiries”96 into the history of the site prior to purchase. 
III.  BROWNFIELDS AND THE 2002 AMENDMENTS 
A.  Deindustrialization and Brownfields 
Even as the Love Canal crisis and Superfund debates were occurring, 
the face of America’s industrial cities was changing.  Manufacturers 
moved overseas,97 to different regions of the United States,98 or to 
suburban industrial parks that offered more room for expansion.99  
Between the early 1960s and the early 1980s, the United States’ share of 
global manufactured exports dropped from twenty-five percent to less than 
seventeen percent.100  Many factories shut down,101 and abandoned 
industrial properties dotted the landscape of American cities.102 
                                                                                                                          
92 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (2006).  A purchaser who acquires land after disposal is also protected 
if it is a government entity that acquired the land through escheat, tax default or eminent domain, or 
acquired the facility by inheritance or bequest.  Id. 
93 Id. § 9607(b). 
94 Id. § 9601(35)(A). 
95 Id. § 9607(b). 
96 All appropriate inquiries are discussed in more detail infra notes 140–49 and accompanying 
text.  For a discussion of what “all appropriate inquiries” means in practice, see generally Michelle 
Weiler, The Environmental Protection Agency’s New Standard for CERCLA All Appropriate Inquiry, 
14 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 159 (2007); Nancy A. Mangone, Brownfields Redevelopment: A Practitioners 
Guide to EPA’s “All Appropriate Inquiries” Rule, 43 ARIZ. ATT’Y 32 (2006), available at 
http://www.myazbar.org/AZAttorney/PDF_Articles/1206Brown1.pdf. 
97 See BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNETT HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA 6 
(1982) (citing the example of General Electric, which in the 1970s added 30,000 foreign jobs and cut 
25,000 domestic jobs). 
98 See id. at 164–70 (discussing the movement of manufacturing out of the Northeast and Midwest 
and into the South and Plains states, where unionization is less common and labor costs are lower). 
99 See Mark D. Bjelland, Brownfield Sites in Minneapolis–St. Paul: The Interwoven Geographies 
of Industrial Disinvestment and Environmental Contamination, 25 URB. GEOGRAPHY 631, 639–40 
(2004). 
100 BLUESTONE & HARRISON, supra note 97, at 5. 
101 See id. at 9. 
102 See JENNIFER S. VEY, RESTORING PROSPERITY: THE STATE ROLE IN REVITALIZING 
AMERICA’S OLDER INDUSTRIAL CITIES 23 (2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/ 
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These abandoned industrial properties have come to symbolize urban 
neglect and decay,103 and have caused a number of problems for the 
communities in which they are located.  Brownfields may lower property 
values, both by being aesthetically unattractive and by stigmatizing the 
nearby area as environmentally contaminated.104  When an industrial site is 
abandoned, waste control strategies that may have succeeded with 
maintenance fall into disrepair, making the release of hazardous substances 
more likely.105  Brownfields also raise a host of environmental justice 
concerns, as they are more likely to be located in depressed, urban, and 
disproportionally minority areas.106  Brownfield redevelopment provides a 
two-fold benefit: “an opportunity to both reverse the decay of already 
developed areas and slow unsustainable development trends throughout the 
country.”107 
While some contaminated land was addressed through CERCLA 
during its first decade, there were more sites than legislators had 
                                                                                                                          
Files/rc/reports/2007/05metropolitanpolicy_vey/20070520_oic.pdf (“[D]eindustrialization has left a 
tremendous environmental legacy, manifested in the large numbers of contaminated parcels that scar 
older industrial cities’ waterfronts and urban cores.”). 
103 See KARL LINN, URBAN HABITAT PROGRAM, FROM RUBBLE TO RESTORATION 2 (1991) (“The 
loss of an economic base has left many cities with extensive areas of unused land.  Acre upon acre of 
vacant litter strewn land symbolizes many cities as places of desolation and decay in the minds of 
residents and visitors alike.”); Paul Stanton Kibel, The Urban Nexus: Open Space, Brownfields, and 
Justice, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 589, 598 (1998) (“The vision of the vacant urban lot embodies 
most of the elements commonly associated with the decline of our cities: pollution and garbage, 
unemployment, poverty, racial isolation, crime, drugs, declining public services, and architectural 
eyesores.”); Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, One Piece of the Puzzle: Why State Brownfields Programs 
Can’t Lure Businesses to the Urban Cores Without Finding the Missing Pieces, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 
1075, 1078 (1999). 
104 See Dennis A. Kaufman & Norman R. Cloutier, The Impact of Small Brownfields and 
Greenspaces on Residential Property Values, 33 J. REAL ESTATE FINAN. ECON. 19, 25–29 (2006) 
(using empirical results to examine the impact of brownfields on property values in Kenosha, 
Wisconsin and finding that brownfield remediation would raise the total property value in a single 
neighborhood by between $1.19 and $4.31 million). 
105 See COLTEN & SKINNER, supra note 40, at 147; Douglas A. McWilliams, Environmental 
Justice and Industrial Redevelopment: Economics and Equality in Urban Revitalization, 21 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 705, 717 (1994). 
106 See Nancy Perkins, A Tale of Two Brownfield Sites: Making the Best of Times from the Worst 
of Times in Western Pennsylvania’s Steel Valley, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 503, 520–32.  For 
further discussion of brownfields and environmental justice, see Stephen M. Johnson, The Brownfields 
Action Agenda: A Model for Future Federal/State Cooperation in the Quest for Environmental 
Justice?, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 85, 95 (1996); Lincoln L. Davies, Note, Working Toward a 
Common Goal? Three Case Studies of Brownfields Redevelopment in Environmental Justice 
Communities, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 285, 288 (1999); William T. D. Freeland, Note, Environmental 
Justice and the Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2001: Brownfields of Dreams or a Nightmare in the 
Making, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 183, 187 (2004). 
107 Wernstedt et al., supra note 14, at 4; see also JONATHAN P. DEASON ET AL., PUBLIC POLICIES 
AND PRIVATE DECISIONS AFFECTING THE REDEVELOPMENT OF BROWNFIELDS: AN ANALYSIS OF 
CRITICAL FACTORS, RELATIVE WEIGHTS AND AREAL DIFFERENTIALS, at ch. 5 (2001), available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~eem/Brownfields/project_report/report.htm (finding that the redevelopment of 
one acre of brownfield land may prevent the development of an average of 4.5 acres of as-yet 
undeveloped “greenfield” land). 
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anticipated, and they were taking longer than expected to clean up.108  
Additionally, CERCLA’s role as a public health statute made it ill-suited to 
address sites with low or uncertain levels of contamination.  In the 1980s 
and 1990s, policy makers began to turn their attention toward brownfields, 
the industrial sites that were not heavily contaminated enough to be 
remediation priorities under CERCLA.109  States began to institute 
voluntary cleanup programs, which allow landowners to remediate their 
property voluntarily, in exchange for liability protection and less stringent 
cleanup standards.110  In 1993, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) began its “Brownfield Initiative” with a pilot grant to Cuyahoga 
County, Ohio.111  Congress began funding the EPA Brownfields program 
through earmarks in the annual Superfund appropriation in 1997.112 
Proponents of brownfield revitalization criticized CERCLA, arguing 
that its expansive net of liability discouraged developers from dealing with 
environmentally compromised land.113  The EPA is not involved in the 
typical brownfield cleanup, but the specter of CERCLA liability looms and 
drives away investors.114  Under CERCLA (as originally written) if 
contamination was discovered after an investor purchased a site, he could 
be held liable for the whole cost of a CERCLA clean up, even if he had 
absolutely nothing to do with the placement of the contamination on the 
site.115  This makes investment in brownfield land that much more risky 
than investment in other land, and thus less attractive to investors. 
In 2001, a bipartisan group of senators endorsed CERCLA 
amendments that limited liability and encouraged brownfield 
redevelopment.116  Senator Bob Smith, a Republican from New Hampshire, 
                                                                                                                          
108 See S. REP. NO. 105-192, at 2 (1998). 
When the law was first enacted, it was expected that only a few hundred sites would 
require Federal attention and that cleanups could be accomplished with relatively 
limited Federal funding.  Almost 41,000 sites, however, have been included on 
EPA’s national inventory of hazardous waste sites, the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Information System 
(CERCLIS). 
Id. 
109 See Ira Whitman, Overcoming Environmental Constraints to Redevelopment, in 
REDEVELOPMENT: PLANNING, LAW, AND PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 175, 202 (Brian W. Blaesser & 
Thomas P. Cody eds., 2008); Hula, supra note 5, at 192. 
110 Hula, supra note 5, at 192. 
111 Jonathan D. Weiss, Federal Brownfields Initiatives, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE 
GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 43, 50 (Todd S. Davis ed., 2d ed. 2002). 
112 H.R. REP. NO. 109-616, at 3 (2006). 
113 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
114 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BROWNFIELDS HANDBOOK: HOW TO MANAGE FEDERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY RISKS 10 (2002). 
115 See supra notes 65–85 and accompanying text. 
116 See 147 CONG. REC. 6232, 6232–33 (2001) (statement of Sen. Inhofe) (expressing a desire that 
businesses “feel adequately protected” and invest in brownfield redevelopment); 147 CONG. REC. 6242 
(2001) (statement of Sen. Carnahan) (“By providing liability protection and economic incentives to 
clean up contaminated and abandoned industrial sites, this legislation will make our communities 
healthier and reduce environmental threats.”); Id. at 6242 (statement of Sen. Lieberman) (noting that 
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touted Senate Bill 350, which would later become the part of the 
Brownfields Act,117 saying: 
What this does is it limits the liability and brings us 
closer to finality in cleanup so we can now get contractors to 
go on these sites.  They can get the insurance, they can take 
the risk, and they are not going to be held accountable if a 
hot spot or some other problem that was not their fault 
occurs several years down the road.  That has been the 
problem to date.  They cannot do it because they will be held 
liable so they say, fine, we are not going to go on the site and 
clean it up and take the risk. 
If a contractor comes onto a site, he is responsible.  If he 
does what he is supposed to do, follows the plans as he is 
supposed to, cleans it up and does it in good faith and we find 
something later, he is not accountable.  That is why this bill 
will go so far toward moving us in the right direction, getting 
these sites cleaned up.118 
Senator Barbara Boxer, a Democrat from California, also endorsed the bill: 
This bill includes liability relief for innocent parties.  
These innocent parties are people who are interested in 
cleaning up the brownfield site, but they are afraid to get 
involved because they may become liable for somebody 
else’s mess.  Our bill makes it clear that innocent parties will 
not be held liable under Superfund for the work they do on a 
brownfield site.  This provision alone should help reduce the 
fear of developers and real estate interests, and it should lead 
to more cleanups.  This provision is certainly a strong reason 
that a variety of business and real estate interests are strong 
supporters of the bill.  They want to come in; they want to 
clean up the sites; but they don’t want to now become held 
liable for past problems and then be hauled into court on a 
Superfund case.119 
In April 2001, the bill passed in the Senate with a vote of 99-0.120  In 
December 2001, the Senate bill on brownfields was combined with a 
House initiative to protect small businesses from CERCLA liability, and 
                                                                                                                          
the Bill would provide “important legal protections that will give developers, private and public, the 
confidence to cleanup these toxic sites”). 
117 GERRARD & GROSS, supra note 87, at 33–34. 
118 147 CONG. REC. 6235 (2001) (statement of Sen. Smith) (emphasis added). 
119 147 CONG. REC. 6241 (2001) (statement of Sen. Boxer) (emphasis added). 
120 147 CONG. REC. 6257 (2001). 
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passed in both houses of Congress.121  President George W. Bush 
enthusiastically signed the bill, citing the reluctance of developers to build 
on brownfields as a cause of urban decline and suburban sprawl.122 
B.  Liability Protections Under the Brownfields Act 
The Brownfields Act clarified the innocent landowner defense123 and 
added two additional affirmative third party defenses: the bona fide 
prospective purchaser defense124 and the contiguous landowner defense.125  
The contiguous landowner defense is similar to the innocent landowner 
defense in that it applies to landowners who “did not cause, contribute, or 
consent to the release or threatened release” and who acquired their land 
without knowing of the contamination.126  In contrast to the innocent 
landowner defense, the hazardous material in question did not originate on 
that parcel, it migrated in from offsite.  In other words, the defense protects 
“parties that are essentially victims of pollution incidents caused by their 
neighbor’s actions.”127  In order to qualify under this defense, the 
landowner must have conducted all appropriate inquiries128 into the history 
of the site and not discovered the contamination before purchase.129 
The bona fide prospective purchaser defense was provided specifically 
to encourage brownfield redevelopment by shielding developers from 
liability.130  This defense is available with respect to property acquired after 
the Brownfields Act’s adoption on January 11, 2002.131  It may be used by 
parties who, upon conducting all appropriate inquiries before purchasing 
property, discover it to be contaminated.132  Under this defense, a “bona 
fide prospective purchaser whose potential liability . . . is based solely on 
the purchaser’s being considered to be an owner or operator of a facility 
                                                                                                                          
121 GERRARD & GROSS, supra note 87, at 33–34. 
122 See George W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields 
Revitalization Act in Conshohocken, Penn. (Jan. 11, 2002), available at http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=62694&st=brownfield&st1=. 
123 See supra notes 86–96 and accompanying text. 
124 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40) (2006). 
125 42 U.S.C. § 9607(q) (2006).  This codifies previously existing EPA policy not to take 
enforcement action against landowners when the property was contaminated through passive migration.  
See Policy Toward Owners of Property Containing Contaminated Aquifers, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,790 (July 
3, 1995). 
126 42 U.S.C. § 9607(q)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
127 S. REP. NO. 107-2, at 10 (2001). 
128 See infra notes 140–52 and accompanying text. 
129 42 U.S.C. § 9607(q)(A)(1)(viii) (2006). 
130 See supra notes 116–22 and accompanying text. 
131 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40) (2006). 
132 See Memorandum from Susan E. Bromm, Dir., Office of Site Remediation Enforcement, on 
Interim Guidance Regarding Criteria Landowners Must Meet in Order to Qualify for Bona Fide 
Prospective Purchaser, Contiguous Property Owner, or Innocent Landowner Limitations on CERCLA 
Liability (“Common Elements”) to the Dirs., Adm’rs, and Regional Counsel of the EPA, 3 (Mar. 6, 
2003), available at www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/cleanup/superfund/common-elem-
guide.pdf [hereinafter Common Elements Memo]. 
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shall not be liable as long as the bona fide prospective purchaser does not 
impede the performance of a response action or natural resource 
restoration.”133  Significantly, in order to qualify for protection as a bona 
fide prospective purchaser, the purchaser must show that “[a]ll disposal of 
hazardous substances at the facility occurred before the person acquired the 
facility.”134 
C.  Conditions to Liability Protection 
By design, it is not easy to achieve liability protection under the 
Brownfields Act.  As Senator Boxer made clear, the Brownfields Act was 
intended to “maintain ‘the polluter pays’ principle that underpins many of 
our hazardous waste statutes.”135  Accordingly, liability protection is 
conditioned upon a series of strict eligibility requirements.  First, all three 
classes of protected landowners must have conducted “all appropriate 
inquiries” to assess the level of contamination of the site before purchasing 
it.136  Secondly, they must take reasonable steps to (1) stop continuing 
releases; (2) prevent threatened future releases; and (3) prevent or limit 
human, environmental, or natural resource exposure to earlier hazardous 
substance releases.137  Finally, all three types of protected landowners must 
comply with continuing obligations in order to retain the defense against 
CERCLA liability.138  The continuing obligations are meant to limit human 
exposure to toxins and may include zoning changes or deed restrictions.139 
The current standards defining “all appropriate inquiries” are quite 
rigorous, and they must be followed by all parties seeking liability 
protection on land purchased after January 11, 2002.140  All appropriate 
                                                                                                                          
133 42 U.S.C. § 9607(r)(1) (2006). 
134 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(A) (2006). 
135 147 CONG. REC. 6215, 6241 (2001) (statement of Sen. Boxer). 
136 Common Elements Memo, supra note 132, at 10.  The EPA stresses that all appropriate 
inquiries must have been performed before purchase rather than after.  Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601(40)(B), 9607(q)(1)(A)(viii), 9601(35)(A)(i), 9601(35)(B)(i) (2006). 
137 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(40)(D), 9607(q)(1)(A)(iii), 9601(35)(B)(i)(II); Common Elements Memo, 
supra note 132, at 9. 
138 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(40)(F), 9607(q)(1)(A)(v), 9601(35)(A); Common Elements Memo, supra 
note 132, at 6. 
139 Common Elements Memo, supra note 132, at 7. 
140 The Brownfields Act directed the EPA to promulgate standards for all appropriate inquiries 
and land transactions that occur after the date of the Brownfields Act’s passage (January 11, 2002) are 
subject to this standard.  42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B)(ii) (2006).  The final standard went into effect on 
November 1, 2006.  Before the final rule went into effect, parties were required to follow standards set 
forth by the American Society for Testing and Materials (“ASTM”) which were substantially similar.  
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ALL APPROPRIATE INQUIRIES FINAL RULE FACT SHEET 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/aai/aai_final_factsheet.pdf.  As the bona fide prospective purchaser 
defense is only available with respect to land purchased after January 11, 2002, all bona fide 
prospective purchasers are subject to the same standard for all appropriate inquiries.  Parties asserting 
an innocent landowner defense are subject to varying standards, depending on when the land in 
question was purchased.  See infra notes 147–49 and accompanying text. 
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inquiries must be conducted by an “environmental professional”141 no 
more than 180 days before the closing date of the sale.142  The 
environmental professional must consider the past and present uses of the 
property (including any use of hazardous materials), past and present waste 
management practices on the site, and whether the area appears to be 
contaminated upon inspection.143  Information may be collected by 
interviewing past and present owners and neighbors, and consulting old 
phone books, fire insurance maps, property records, and other sources.144  
The environmental professional will identify “data gaps” in his report, and 
while a more thorough investigation may be advisable, it is not mandated 
by the “all appropriate inquiries” standard.145  It is important, however, to 
conduct a thorough inquiry, because an incomplete inquiry into the history 
of the parcel will not protect the owner from liability.146 
For landowners seeking to establish an innocent landowner defense 
with respect to property purchased before the enactment of the Brownfields 
Act, the standards for all appropriate inquiries are somewhat looser.147  For 
property purchased before May 31, 1997, a court would consider 
commonly known information about the property, the defendant’s 
specialized knowledge or experience, the “obviousness of the presence or 
likely presence of contamination at the property,” and other factors.148  
With respect to property purchased on or after May 31, 1997, but before 
the promulgation of the final rule discussed above, procedures outlined by 
the American Society for Testing and Materials fulfill the requirements.149  
These procedures are similar to the final rule for all appropriate inquiries. 
Regardless of when the land was purchased, landowners must also take 
                                                                                                                          
141 An “environmental professional” is “a person who possesses sufficient specific education, 
training, and experience necessary to exercise professional judgment to develop opinions and 
conclusions regarding conditions indicative of releases or threatened releases . . . on, at, in, or to a 
property, sufficient to meet the objectives and performance factors in § 312.20(e) and (f).”  40 C.F.R. § 
312.10 (2005); Standards and Practices for All Appropriate Inquiries, 70 Fed. Reg. 66,070, 66,108 
(Nov. 1, 2005). 
142 Standards and Practices for All Appropriate Inquiries, 70 Fed. Reg. at 66,083. 
143 Id. at 66,087. 
144 Id. at 66,088–89. 
145 Mangone, supra note 96, at 36. 
146 Unfortunately, this standard, like so many in CERCLA, is frustratingly vague.  See Weiler, 
supra note 96, at 182 (noting that “it is still unclear whether acknowledgment of data gaps can impact 
the validity of an AAI”). 
147 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (35)(B)(iv)(I) (2006); see also R.E. Goodson Constr. Co. v. Int’l Paper Co., 
No. 4:02-4184-RBH, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42909, at *43–44 (D.S.C. Oct. 13, 2005) (finding that the 
sufficiency of a party’s inquiries into the site must be judged with reference to the time period in which 
they occurred, because “[a]ny other finding would hold landowners to the impossibly high standard of 
complying with current perceptions of appropriateness in an area where perceptions change quickly”). 
148 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (35)(B)(iv)(I). 
149 Id. § 9601 (35)(B)(iv)(II); see also ASTM STANDARD E1527-97, STANDARD PRACTICE FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL SITE ASSESSMENT: PHASE 1 ENVIRONMENTAL SITE ASSESSMENT PROCESS (1997), 
available at http://www.astm.org/DATABASE.CART/HISTORICAL/E1527-97.htm. 
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reasonable steps with respect to contaminants on their property.150  The 
EPA has interpreted this language as a congressional attempt to ensure 
environmental protection while declining to impose the same standards on 
protected landowners as on potentially responsible parties.151  The EPA 
guidance also emphasizes that “[t]he required reasonable steps relate only 
to responding to contamination for which the [party] . . . is not responsible.  
Activities on the property subsequent to purchase that result in new 
contamination can give rise to full CERCLA liability.”152 
While the “reasonable steps” requirement uses the same language for 
all classes of protected landowners, the EPA notes that the three classes of 
landowners may be held to different standards as a reflection of their 
different circumstances.153  Since bona fide prospective purchasers 
acquired the land with knowledge of the contamination, and therefore with 
a more complete understanding of the hazardous substances that must be 
controlled, they may be held to a higher standard.  As yet there has been 
very little judicial interpretation of the “reasonable steps” standard.  The 
EPA notes, however, that “the existing case law on due care provides a 
reference point for evaluating the reasonable steps requirement.”154 
The “due care” standard ensures that parties who do not take action, 
allowing the environmental situation on their property to get worse, will 
not be afforded protected landowner status.  The Sixth Circuit, in Franklin 
County Convention Facilities Authority v. American Premier 
Underwriters, Inc., provides an instructive example of how the innocent 
landowner defense can be lost through conduct that does not constitute 
“due care.”155  The plaintiff, Franklin County Convention Facilities 
Authority (“CFA”), leased property near railroads in Columbus, Ohio for 
the purpose of constructing a convention center.156  Buried on the property 
was a large wooden box which had been constructed some time prior to 
1901 to treat wood for use as railroad ties.157  No records of the box 
existed, and it had not been discovered in the course of three 
environmental assessments of the property.158  In October 1990, a 
contractor accidentally split the box open with a backhoe, releasing the 
                                                                                                                          
150 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(40)(D), 9607(q)(1)(A)(iii), 9601(35)(B)(i)(II) (2006). 
151 Common Elements Memo, supra note 132, at 9.  The EPA guidance points out that because 
bona fide prospective purchasers knew of the contamination before purchasing the land, but innocent 
landowners and contiguous landowners did not, bona fide prospective purchasers might need to take 
more action to satisfy the “reasonable steps” requirement.  Id. at 10. 
152 Id. at 11. 
153 Id. at 10. 
154 Id. at 11. 
155 Franklin County Convention Facilities Auth. v. Amer. Premier Underwriters, Inc., 240 F.3d 
534 (6th Cir. 2001). 
156 Id. at 539. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
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benzene and creosote that the box contained.159 
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found that 
CFA was an innocent landowner, and the defendant appealed.160  The Sixth 
Circuit rejected the district court’s determination that CFA was an innocent 
landowner on the grounds that it had not exercised due care with respect to 
the contamination.161  While CFA stopped work and alerted authorities 
when the box was discovered, it did not take adequate steps to prevent the 
contamination from spreading.162  Contaminants were allowed to migrate a 
distance of forty-five feet along an open sewer, and an adequate barrier 
was not erected until more than a year after the spill.163  CFA’s failure to 
take due care to prevent the spread of contamination proved fatal to its 
attempt to use the innocent landowner defense. 
While some commentators have argued that the Brownfields Act does 
not go far enough to protect human health,164 it hardly gives polluters a free 
pass.  Due to the strict eligibility requirements and the ambiguity in many 
of those requirements, it may even be too difficult to establish a protected 
landowner defense.165  In addition to all of the conditions described above, 
a party is ineligible for the protected landowner defenses if disposal 
occurred during his ownership period.166  The remainder of this Note 
discusses the problematic definition of “disposal” in CERCLA case law. 
IV.  THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE WORD “DISPOSAL” 
As a party seeking to establish liability protection as an innocent 
landowner or bona fide prospective purchaser, the landowner must show 
by a preponderance of the evidence that all disposal occurred before he 
acquired the property.167  Thus, the exact meaning of “disposal” is critical.  
                                                                                                                          
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 548.  The court did not reverse CFA’s designation as an innocent landowner simply 
because its construction activities had lead to the breaking of the box.  “First, we note that CFA played 
no role in placing the hazardous substance at the site, nor could have reasonably been aware of the 
box’s presence.  Moreover, even though CFA’s contractor split open the box, this was accidental and 
unavoidable, and cannot fairly be attributed to CFA.”  Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 See, e.g., Seth Schofield, Note, In Search of the Institution in Institutional Controls: The 
Failure of the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002 and the Need 
for Federal Legislation, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 946, 1020 (2005). 
165 See Stanley A. Millan, Contemporary CERCLA: Reversals of Fortune and Black Holes, 16 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 183, 204 (2005); Timothy Harmon & Karen Williams, Brownfields 
Revitalization Act: Big Promises Not Delivered in New Brownfields Law, ENVIRONS (Lane Powell 
Spears Lubersky LLP, Seattle, Wash.), Summer 2002, at 2. 
166 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A), 9601(40)(A) (2006). 
167 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A), 9601(40)(A).  By definition, contiguous property owners own land 
that was contaminated by waste migrating in from off-site, rather than being disposed of on-site.  42 
U.S.C. § 9607(q) (2006).  Therefore, the definition of disposal is not significant with respect to 
contiguous landowners, so that defense will not be analyzed in this section. 
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“Disposal” is defined by CERCLA as the “discharge, deposit, injection, 
dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous 
waste into or on any land or water.”168  The federal courts disagree as to 
which factual scenarios would constitute “disposal” and which would not, 
so the same course of events may lead to CERCLA liability in some 
jurisdictions but not others. 
The term “disposal” does not just describe the initial introduction of 
contaminants to a site, but also any spreading of the contaminants that may 
have been caused by human activity.169  Disposal is not a “one-time 
occurrence—there may be other disposals when hazardous materials are 
moved, dispersed, or released during landfill excavations and fillings.”170  
For example, in Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 
the Fifth Circuit held a residential developer liable under CERCLA for 
spreading creosote-contaminated soil during site grading.171  The question, 
therefore, is what degree of human activity is required in order for the 
spread of contaminants to constitute disposal? 
As the Ninth Circuit explained, the various “opinions cannot be 
shoehorned into the dichotomy of a classic circuit split.  Rather, a careful 
reading of their holdings suggests a more nuanced range of views, 
depending in large part on the factual circumstances of the case.”172  The 
holdings of the various federal courts can, however, be broadly 
categorized.  Commentators point to the distinction between active and 
passive disposal,173 but it is most helpful to discuss the issue in terms of 
three categories of situations.  In the first category, which this Note shall 
refer to as “active disposal,” contaminants are introduced to or moved 
around the site through active human conduct.  Such a situation clearly 
constitutes disposal under CERCLA.174  On the other end of the spectrum 
                                                                                                                          
168 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29), which refers to the definition of “disposal” in the Solid Waste Disposal 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2006). 
169 Liability may attach even if contaminants are spread through a benign activity such as soil 
testing.  See generally Jennifer L. Scheller, Note, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: The CERCLA 
Liability Exposure Unfortunately Created by Pre-acquisition Soil Testing, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1930 
(2005) (discussing how soil testing can lead to liability exposure). 
170 Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1573 (5th Cir. 1988); 
see also United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 719 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6903(3), ‘disposal’ is defined in part as the ‘discharge’ or ‘placing’ of waste ‘into or on any land or 
water.’  ‘Disposal’ thus includes not only the initial introduction of contaminants onto a property but 
also the spreading of contaminants due to subsequent activity.”); Redwing Carriers v. Saraland 
Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1510 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e do not read CERCLA’s definition of 
‘disposal’ as being limited to instances where a hazardous substance is initially introduced into the 
environment at a facility.”); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 
1342 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Congress did not limit the term [disposal] to the initial introduction of hazardous 
material onto property.”). 
171 Tanglewood E. Homeowners, 849 F.2d at 1571. 
172 Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 875 (9th Cir. 2001). 
173 See, e.g., Starr, supra note 23, at 446. 
174 As courts typically interpret CERCLA’s provisions broadly, any active human conduct that 
could fairly be considered the “discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of 
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is a situation which this Note shall refer to as “migration,” in which 
contaminants move within the environment through natural means (as 
when liquid percolates through the soil, or contaminants migrate within a 
landfill).  The courts of appeals that have commented on the issue have 
held that migration does not constitute disposal.175 
It is an intermediate scenario, which this Note shall refer to as “passive 
leaking,” that presents the greatest analytical difficulties.  In this scenario, 
contaminants move through passive means from some sort of man-made 
containment into the environment (as when contaminants leak from a 
drum).  The courts disagree as to whether passive leaking constitutes 
disposal.  The Fourth Circuit has held that it does176 and the Sixth Circuit 
has held that it does not.177  The Second,178 Third,179 and Ninth180 Circuits 
have not directly commented on the issue, but have suggested that they 
would agree with the Fourth Circuit. 
When contaminants migrate through completely natural means, this 
movement does not constitute disposal.  For example, the natural 
movement of waste within a landfill was held by the Third Circuit not to 
constitute disposal in United States v. CDMG Realty Co.181  Dowell owned 
the property for six years and did not use it (except to perform 
environmental testing) then sold it to another party.182  The later owner 
sued Dowell for remediation costs, claiming that as waste tends to migrate 
within landfills, Dowell had owned the site at the time of disposal.183  The 
court examined the words used to define disposal under CERCLA and 
found that while the words “leaking” and “spilling” have passive 
meanings, they “should be read to require affirmative human action” in this 
context.184  To reinforce its conclusion, the court asserted that the innocent 
landowner defense would be a nullity if passive migration constituted 
                                                                                                                          
any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water” would be held to constitute disposal.  
See infra Part V.A. 
175 See infra notes 181–92 and accompanying text. 
176 Crofton Ventures Ltd. P’ship v. G & H P’ship, 258 F.3d 292, 297 (4th Cir. 2001); Nurad, Inc. 
v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 846 (4th Cir. 1992); see also infra notes 193–206 and 
accompanying text. 
177 United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 705 (6th Cir. 2000); see also infra notes 
208–12 and accompanying text. 
178 Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Jones Chem., Inc., 315 F.3d 171, 178 (2d Cir. 2003); see also 
infra notes 219–20 and accompanying text. 
179 United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 711 (3d Cir. 1996); see also infra notes 214–
18 and accompanying text. 
180 Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp, 270 F.3d 863, 879 (9th Cir. 2001); see also infra 
notes 221–24 and accompanying text. 
181 CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 711. 
182 Id. at 711–12. 
183 Id. at 712. 
184 See id. at 714 (“The words surrounding ‘leaking’ and ‘spilling’—‘discharge,’ ‘deposit,’ 
‘injection,’ ‘dumping,’ and ‘placing’—all envision a human actor.”). 
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disposal.185  As the innocent landowner defense only applies if the owner 
acquired the property after disposal occurred, the defense would be nearly 
impossible to use if gradual spreading of contamination constituted 
disposal.186 
The Second Circuit explicitly adopted the Third Circuit’s reasoning the 
following year.187  In 2003, the Second Circuit again addressed passive 
migration and discussed disposal by “leaking” in more detail.188  A 
business called Tar Asphalt Services cleaned its trucks with kerosene and 
allowed the tar and kerosene runoff to flow onto a neighboring property 
called Niagara Flats.189  The court held that the then-owner of Niagara 
Flats, Mohawk Valley Oil, was not liable under CERCLA as an owner at 
the time of “disposal.”190  As the Second Circuit does not recognize purely 
passive migration as disposal, there was no disposal on the Niagara Flats 
property.191  The court noted, however, that the passive migration of 
contaminants from a container into the environment could constitute 
disposal under CERCLA.192 
In Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., the Fourth Circuit 
specifically confronted the issue of leaky underground storage tanks, and 
decided that a leak from a drum does constitute disposal.193  Nurad is cited 
as the bedrock case defining “disposal” in a passive way.194  Nurad was the 
current owner of a site which had incurred remediation costs in removing 
leaky underground tanks of mineral oil.195  It brought suit against several 
previous owners for contribution, including Mumaw, from whom it had 
bought the property.196  The district court found that Mumaw was not liable 
since he had not owned the site “at the time of disposal”—at the time the 
tanks were buried.197  The court of appeals rejected the district court’s 
                                                                                                                          
185 Id. at 716. 
186 Id. 
187 ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 358 (2d Cir. 1997). 
188 Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Jones Chem., Inc., 315 F.3d 171, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2003). 
189 Id. at 174. 
190 Id. at 179. 
191 Id. at 178. 
192 Id. 
193 Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 840–41, 845 (4th Cir. 1992). 
194 While not all of these cases agree with the Fourth Circuit, Nurad’s definition of “disposal” is 
cited in numerous cases, including ABB Industrial Systems, Inc. v. Prime Technology, Inc., 120 F.3d 
351, 358 n.3 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 713 (3d Cir. 1996); 
Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. Koppers Co., 40 F.3d 750, 761–62 (5th Cir. 1994); Sycamore Industrial 
Park Associates v. Ericsson, Inc., No. 06-C-0768, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23881, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
30, 2007); Spectrum International Holdings, Inc. v. Universal Cooperatives, Inc., Civil No. 04-99, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49716, at *19–20 (D. Minn. July 17, 2006); City of Bangor v. Citizens 
Communications Co., Civil No. 02-183-B-S, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3845, at *40 (D. Me. Mar. 11, 
2004); and Bob’s Beverage, Inc. v. Acme, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d 695, 730 (N.D. Ohio 1999). 
195 Nurad, 966 F.2d at 840–41. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 841 (internal quotation omitted).  The decision was appealed by Nurad and by another 
defendant, Hooper, whom the court found had been the owner at the time of disposal.  Id. 
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active construction of “disposal,” saying that “a requirement conditioning 
liability upon affirmative human participation in contamination . . . 
frustrates the statutory purpose.”198  The court found that Mumaw was 
liable as a former owner because he had not “overcome the presumption” 
that the tanks had leaked steadily over time, including the period in which 
he had owned the land.199 
The Fourth Circuit elaborated upon its position on leaking drums in 
Crofton Ventures Ltd. Partnership v. G & H Partnership.200  Plaintiff 
Crofton had purchased a parcel of land from the defendants, who had 
represented in the sale contract that the property had not been 
contaminated with any hazardous substances.201  When Crofton began to 
develop the site in 1995, he discovered 285 fully or partially buried fifty-
five-gallon drums containing asphalt and trichloroethylene in addition to 
“truck tires, household appliances, and other similar refuse.”202  Crofton 
remediated the site and sued the previous owners to recover his costs.203  
The district court analyzed the issue of liability in terms of who had placed 
the drums in question on the site.204  It found that since there was no 
evidence that the defendants had “placed” the contaminants on the site, 
they were not liable.205  The court of appeals reversed, holding that under 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) an owner or operator may be held liable for 
contamination if he was the owner or operator “at the time when hazardous 
waste was either placed on the site or leaked into the environment from a 
source on the site, whether or not such owner or operator was the cause of 
the disposal or, indeed, even had knowledge of it.”206  Several district 
courts have also concluded or suggested that when contaminants leak from 
drums on a site, even without human intervention, “disposal” has 
occurred.207 
The Sixth Circuit, occupying the opposite end of the spectrum, adopted 
an active definition of disposal in United States v. 150 Acres of Land.208  
                                                                                                                          
198 Id. at 845. 
199 Id. at 846. 
200 258 F.3d 292, 297 (4th Cir. 2001). 
201 Id. at 294. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 295. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 296. 
206 Id. at 297. 
207 See, e.g., Servco Pac., Inc. v. Dods, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1197 (D. Haw. 2002) (stating that 
Ninth Circuit precedent dictates that “‘disposal’ does not include general gradual passive migration of 
contamination through the soil” but does include “passive gradual ‘leaking’ such as that from an 
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The defendant owners had inherited land without knowing that there were 
hundreds of drums of toxic substances on the parcel, hidden by dense 
vegetation.209  The EPA began removal actions and sued the landowners 
for contribution, and the owners asserted the innocent landowner defense.  
The court reasoned that “because ‘disposal’ is defined primarily in terms of 
active words such as injection, deposit, and placing, the potentially passive 
words ‘spilling’ and ‘leaking’ should be interpreted actively.”210  
Therefore, the court concluded that without “evidence that there was 
human activity involved in whatever movement of hazardous substances 
occurred on the property,” the defendants had not “disposed” of hazardous 
substances.211  The following year, the court reiterated its opinion that 
“disposal” requires active human conduct in Bob’s Beverage, Inc. v. Acme, 
Inc.212  A few other courts have adopted a similarly active construction of 
disposal.213 
In United States v. CDMG Realty Co.,214 the Third Circuit held that 
migration does not constitute disposal,215 but suggested that passive leaking 
may.  While declining to conclude “whether the movement of 
contaminants unaided by human conduct can ever constitute ‘disposal,’”216 
the court distinguished between leaking and migration.  The court stated 
that while the word “leaking” implied passive movement of contaminants, 
it was inapplicable to the case at bar because the waste was not leaking out 
of any containment.217  The court noted, however, that the word “leaking” 
“would encompass the escape of waste through a hole in a drum.”218  
Similarly, the Second Circuit suggested that a leaking drum would 
constitute “disposal” in Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Jones Chemical, 
Inc.219  The court stated that while “leaking” implied passive movement of 
contaminants, it was inapplicable in that case because “[leaking] denotes 
the passage of a substance into or out of a containment.”220  Therefore, 
both the Second and Third Circuits would likely find that the passive 
leaking of a drum or other containment does constitute disposal. 
                                                                                                                          
209 Id. at 701. 
210 Id. at 706. 
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The Ninth Circuit, in Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 
rejected rigid rules, instead opting to determine whether disposal had 
occurred on a case-by-case basis.221  “Instead of focusing solely on whether 
the terms are ‘active’ or ‘passive,’ we must examine each of the terms in 
relation to the facts of the case and determine whether the movement of 
contaminants is, under the plain meaning of the terms, a ‘disposal.’”222  
The court examined the situation, which had involved passive migration of 
tar and slag, and found that it could not fairly be characterized as a 
“discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing.”223  
The court noted that Congress had intended the word “leaking” to refer to a 
“leaking barrel or underground storage tank,” strongly suggesting that the 
court would disagree with the Sixth Circuit and find passively leaking 
drums to constitute “disposal.”224 
V.  RECONCILING THE DEFINITIONS OF “DISPOSAL” 
A.  “Disposal” and Legislative Intent Under CERCLA 
As Part IV shows, several of the courts of appeals would likely agree 
that when contaminants passively move from a man-made container into 
the environment a disposal may have occurred under CERCLA, whether or 
not the landowner knew that there had been any leaking or spilling.  This 
definition of “disposal” is consistent with CERLCA’s legislative purpose.  
CERCLA was enacted to clean up the nation’s hazardous waste sites, and 
to make the polluters pay for the cleanup.225  In order to effectuate this 
goal, “Congress cast the liability net wide to capture all potentially 
responsible parties.”226  Courts have been mindful of this congressional 
goal, holding that due to CERCLA’s comprehensive remedial intent, courts 
are bound to “construe its provisions liberally to avoid frustrating the 
legislature’s purpose.”227 
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The case law concerning the definition of “facility” provides an 
instructive example of a broad definition under CERCLA.  The Fourth 
Circuit held that a publicly owned sewer system was a “facility” under 
CERCLA because such an interpretation is more consistent with the 
legislative purpose.228  The defendant, Washington Suburban Sanitary 
Commission (“WSSC”), had allowed its sewer pipes to deteriorate, which 
let chemical waste from a dry cleaner seep into the environment.229  
WSSC’s defense was based on the idea that its sewer was not a “facility” 
under CERCLA.  WSSC argued that since RCRA and the Clean Water Act 
each permit the discharge of certain chemicals into sewers, Congress could 
not have intended for sewer operators to be liable for contaminants leaking 
from the sewers.230  The court noted that Congress probably did not 
envision sewer systems as badly deteriorated as the one in question, and 
then turned to the legislative purposes of the various statutory schemes.231  
The court concluded that “CERCLA is a comprehensive remedial statutory 
scheme, and as such, the courts must construe its provisions liberally to 
avoid frustrating the legislature’s purpose.”232  Accordingly, the court 
interpreted CERCLA’s liability provisions broadly and found the sewer to 
be a facility under CERCLA.233 
In Sierra Club v. Seaboard Farms, Inc., the Tenth Circuit relied even 
more explicitly on CERCLA’s legislative intent in broadly construing the 
definition of “facility.”234  The site in question was a hog farm in 
Oklahoma, owned by Seaboard, which was divided into two contiguous 
parcels, Dorman North and Dorman South.235  The Sierra Club argued that, 
taken together as one facility, the farm discharged enough ammonia that it 
was subject to CERCLA’s reporting provisions.236  Seaboard argued that 
each of the barns, waste lagoons, and other components of the farm was a 
separate facility, and as such that it was only required to report a discharge 
if emissions from one particular component of the farm exceeded the 
specified level.237  The court first examined the definition of “facility” 
under CERCLA,238 finding that it was unambiguous and thus not subject to 
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Chevron deference.239  Citing CERCLA’s broad remedial purpose, the 
court held that its legislative aims were “best served through treating the 
Dorman Farm as a single facility.”240  Thus, when there is a question as to 
whether a party is potentially liable under CERCLA, courts are quite likely 
to conclude that the party is indeed liable. 
Furthermore, a definition of disposal that requires affirmative human 
conduct would encourage “indifference to environmental hazards.”241  In 
Nurad, the Fourth Circuit argued that under an active definition of 
“disposal,” an “owner could avoid liability simply by standing idle while 
an environmental hazard festers on his property.”242  The court reasoned 
that if Nurad was liable as a current owner of contaminated property under 
Shore Realty, it would be unfair to allow Mumaw to escape liability, given 
that neither party was actually at fault for the contamination.243  If such a 
situation were allowed, the court reasoned, it would discourage voluntary 
cleanups.244 
The Ninth Circuit shared similar reasoning in Carson Harbor, noting 
that “if ‘disposal’ is interpreted to exclude all passive migration, there 
would be little incentive for a landowner to examine his property for 
decaying disposal tanks, prevent them from spilling or leaking, or to clean 
up contamination once it was found.”245  Given that CERCLA’s purpose is 
to remediate contaminated sites and prevent human exposure to toxins, 
Congress must not have meant to reward owners who remain willfully 
ignorant of the environmental conditions on their land.  Therefore, the 
prevalent view that “disposal” includes passive leaking from a drum or 
underground storage tank (though not migration through the soil) is more 
appropriate in light of CERCLA’s legislative purpose. 
B.  “Disposal” and Legislative Intent Under the Brownfields Act 
While the active definition of “disposal” embraced by the Sixth Circuit 
is inconsistent with the larger CERCLA scheme, it is more consistent with 
the legislative intent of the Brownfields Act than the passive definition 
used by other circuits.  The purpose of the Brownfields Act was to combat 
the problem of vacant industrial land, the redevelopment of which had 
been discouraged by CERCLA’s expansive liability scheme.246  The 
Brownfields Act creates a liability shield, so it makes little sense to apply a 
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definition of disposal that was designed to be a liability hook.  While the 
Fourth and Ninth Circuits point out that an active definition of disposal 
encourages willful ignorance,247 the eligibility requirements248 for the 
protected landowners prevent that from becoming an issue. 
The eligibility requirements for gaining liability protection would be 
nonsensical if the passive definition of disposal was applied.  With regard 
to the “due care” requirement of the innocent landowner defense,249 the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas noted that innocent 
landowners cannot, by definition, exercise due care with respect to 
contamination that they do not know is there.250  To qualify as an innocent 
landowner, an entity must “make all appropriate inquiries prior to 
purchasing a piece of property and lack actual knowledge of the pollution 
at the time of purchase; then, whenever the landowner subsequently 
discovers the contamination, he must take reasonable steps to control the 
problem as prescribed in [section] (35)(B)(i)(II).”251  A landowner cannot 
earn protection for taking due care with respect to a leaky drum if he 
becomes strictly liable merely on the basis of the drum’s existence.  The 
“reasonable steps” standard to which bona fide prospective purchasers are 
to be held presents the same problem.  If Congress had intended for 
undiscovered, ongoing leaks to automatically defeat a protected landowner 
defense, the “due care” and “reasonable steps” standards would be 
meaningless. 
The language of an EPA guidance document commonly known as the 
“Common Elements” memo suggests that the EPA does not consider a 
hidden ongoing leak to be an automatic bar to protected status.252  One of 
the questions in the “Question and Answer” section asks whether a 
property owner who has discovered that “the containment system for an 
on-site waste pile has been breached” would be required by the 
“reasonable steps” standard to repair the breach.253  The EPA replied that, 
ordinarily, a protected landowner would be required to stop continuing 
releases, and does not hint at the notion that contaminants leaking from a 
man-made containment could defeat a protected landowner defense in 
                                                                                                                          
247 See supra notes 241–45 and accompanying text. 
248 See supra notes 135–66 and accompanying text. 
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several federal circuits.254  Surely Congress could not have intended for 
bona fide prospective purchasers to be strictly liable for a breach in a 
containment system created by another party.  Yet depending on how a 
court applied the requirement that all disposal occurred before the bona 
fide purchaser acquired the property, a hidden continuous leak could defeat 
the bona fide prospective purchaser protections. 
Even if the protected landowner defenses are not conditioned on 
disposal having occurred before the party acquired the property, the 
existing requirements provide more than sufficient  protection to the 
environment.  Given the due care/reasonable steps conditions imposed on 
protected landowners, a landowner cannot “avoid liability simply by 
standing idle while an environmental hazard festers on his property.”255  
The “all appropriate inquiries”256 standard provides ample incentive for site 
investigation, contradicting the Ninth Circuit’s assertion that “if ‘disposal’ 
is interpreted to exclude all passive migration, there would be little 
incentive for a landowner to examine his property for decaying disposal 
tanks, prevent them from spilling or leaking, or to clean up contamination 
once it was found.”257  These standards, and the others imposed on 
protected landowners,258 ensure that the environment is protected and that 
only truly non-culpable parties reap the benefits of the protected landowner 
defenses. 
C.  Reconciling the Two Definitions of “Disposal” 
Ideally, Congress would clarify the meaning of disposal, and specify 
that the protected landowner defenses are held to the less stringent 
standard.  Failing that, this Note urges the EPA to promulgate a rule 
clarifying its interpretation of the word “disposal,” adopting a passive 
definition when determining who is a PRP, and an active definition when 
examining whether a landowner may take advantage of one of the 
defenses.  The EPA has the discretion to interpret ambiguous statutory 
directives, and such a complex circuit split over the meaning of disposal 
shows a high degree of ambiguity. 
The EPA has the authority to give the word “disposal” one meaning 
when applied to protected landowners and a different one when applied to 
                                                                                                                          
254 Id.; see also Crofton Ventures Ltd. P’ship v. G & H P’ship, 258 F.3d 292, 297 (4th Cir. 2001) 
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PRPs generally.  While the same term is generally interpreted as having the 
same meaning throughout a statutory scheme, the Supreme Court recently 
reaffirmed the EPA’s right to give the same term, in the same statutory 
scheme, different meanings.  In the 2007 case Environmental Defense v. 
Duke Energy Corp., the Supreme Court examined the EPA’s differing 
interpretations of the word “modification” in two different parts of the 
Clean Air Act.259  Two of the Clean Air Act’s programs, Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) and New Source Performance Standards 
(“NSPS”), looked to changes in emissions to determine whether a change 
to a facility constituted a “modification” that would require new permits.  
The EPA used annual emissions to determine whether a modification of 
the source had occurred under PSD, while it used hourly emissions under 
NSPS.260  The Supreme Court upheld the EPA’s varying definitions of the 
term modification because of the differencing regulatory goals of the 
statutory sections in question.261  As this Note has shown, the legislative 
goals behind the Brownfields Act were quite different from the legislative 
goals that inspired CERCLA’s original passage. 
The EPA’s varying interpretations of the word “disposal” would be 
entitled to judicial deference, provided they were reasonable.  The 
landmark administrative law case Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council laid out the two-step process for determining the level of judicial 
deference that is appropriate.262  First, the court must determine whether 
Congress has “directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”263  If it has, 
courts and agencies must give effect to Congress’s intent.264  Here, the 
circuit split over the meaning of the word “disposal” demonstrates that 
there is ambiguity.  When a statute is ambiguous, the court will defer to the 
reasonable interpretation of the administrative agency tasked with 
implementing the statute.265  Given the level of ambiguity, and the 
differing statutory goals, it would be highly reasonable for the EPA to give 
the word “disposal” different meanings in the two different contexts. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
CERCLA was enacted in 1980 to address a problem that was visible at 
that time: toxic waste sites leaching their contaminants into the 
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environment and harming people and ecosystems.  While CERCLA has led 
to the remediation of a great number of sites, it has had unintended 
consequences and arguably exacerbated the problem of brownfields.  By 
the time the Brownfields Act was passed, contaminated land was the 
subject of completely different political and policy concerns.  The crisis 
was no longer waste seeping into basements; it was acres of urban land 
sitting vacant.  Congress, in making the bona fide prospective purchaser 
defense available, intended to provide a liability shield to parties willing to 
redevelop brownfields.  This liability shield is only available where 
disposal of contaminants ceased before the party purchased the property, 
and given the courts of appeals’ very different interpretations of the term 
“disposal,” the usefulness of the liability shield is unclear. 
Given the ambiguity surrounding the term “disposal,” the definition of 
the term should be clarified.  If there is no “iron rule” requiring that the 
EPA give the same word exactly the same meaning in different statutory 
contexts,266 the EPA should adopt differing definitions for potentially 
responsible parties and protected landowners, reflecting the different 
statutory goals.  The legislative goals behind CERCLA and the 
Brownfields Act were quite different, reflecting the different conditions of 
the times.  While the expansive definition of disposal fits CERCLA’s 
original intent, the intent of the Brownfields Act should be respected as 
well. 
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